What Matters Most in CEO Compensation? by Beavers, Randy
Seattle Pacific University
Digital Commons @ SPU
SPU Works
Fall October 1st, 2018
What Matters Most in CEO Compensation?
Randy Beavers
Seattle Pacific University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/works
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ SPU. It has been accepted for inclusion in SPU Works by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ SPU.
Recommended Citation
Beavers, R. (2018). What matters most in CEO compensation? Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition, 14(3), 23-45.
http://doi.org/10.22495/cbv14i3art3
Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition / Volume 14, Issue 3, 2018 
 
23 






* Seattle Pacific University, USA; 





Recent literature in the compensation space has 
focused on variables that correspond to CEO 
incentives, including inside debt, overconfidence, 
and the CEO pay slice. This paper looks at the most 
recent time when all of this data is available, 
beginning from 2006 to 2013. An in-depth analysis 
of theories the literature has already been provided, 
but this study considers all three together and 
includes interactions in order to remove potential 
omitted variable bias in previous studies. The 
argument of the paper is omitted variable bias in 
previous studies has occurred since overconfidence 
is not considered in inside debt and CEO pay slice 
studies, inside debt is not considered in 
overconfidence and CEO pay slice studies, and the 
CEO pay slice is not considered in overconfidence 
and inside debt studies. 
To ensure this study can be performed, the 
correlation between the variables of interest must be 
relatively low. They are all correlated under the 
absolute value of 7%. My regressions take into 
account all three compensation incentives and 
include interactions among them in the models. With 
respect to previous literature, the results are similar 
to prior findings, but this study attempts to shed 
light on the interactions among these compensation 
incentives to see what truly matters. Interactions 
among these variables lead to an additional positive 
effect for total risk and additional negative effects 
for investment, diversification, liquidity, and firm 
value. My specifications provide insight into a period 
where publicly available compensation data is 
provided at a greater accuracy than before. My 
period from 2006 to 2013 also provides robustness 
to economic factors resulting from the Great 
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Components of compensation have been analysed in previous 
studies of corporate financial variables of interest but never 
together to get a sense of the complete picture of what truly 
matters. This paper includes variable interactions using the 
difference-in-differences methodology for panel regressions. Data 
is collected from Capital IQ, Compustat, CRSP, and ExecuComp for 
S&P 1500 firms from 2006 to 2013. Inside debt is negatively 
related to a firm’s total risk, idiosyncratic risk, and CEO turnover. 
Inside debt is positively related to diversification, liquidity, firm 
value, and return. Overconfidence is negatively related to total 
risk, liquidity, investment, and firm value. The CEO pay slice is 
positively related to total risk but negatively related to 
diversification, liquidity, and firm value. Interactions among these 
variables lead to an increase in total risk but a decrease in 
investment, diversification, liquidity, and firm value. Inside debt 
mitigates CEO risky decision making, whereas CEOs who are 
overconfident by their option exercise behaviour or their relative 
compensation to other directors creates a situation where they are 
encouraged to take on more risk, which, on average, is shown to 
harm the firm.    
 
Keywords: Inside Debt, Overconfidence, CEO Pay Slice, Risk, 
Executive Compensation, Incentives  
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the crisis and concludes several years after the 
economy exited the most recent recession. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature 
to develop testable hypotheses. Section 3 details the 
methodology and data construction. Section 4 
reviews the results of the tests. Section 5 concludes 
with limitations of the study and future suggestions 
for research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The most recent development in the executive 
compensation space has been with the CEO Pay Slice 
(CPS). Since they have more responsibility, CEOs 
receive more pay-performance incentives and 
aggregate team incentives than oversight executives 
and divisional executives (Aggarwal & Samwick, 
2003). Bebchuk et al. (2010) find that lucky grants, 
or option grants timed when the CEO could profit 
the most, are associated with higher levels of pay 
elsewhere. Bebchuk et al. (2011) also analyse this 
higher pay with the CPS measure, defined as the 
percentage of pay the CEO receives relative to the 
total compensation of the top five executives. They 
find that CPS has negative associations with firm 
value, profitability, and stock returns after mergers, 
which increases the agency cost of equity.  
The most developed literature in recent years is 
from overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate (2005) 
find that overconfident CEOs make investments that 
respond more to cash flows. CEOs invest more when 
funds are available and less when external financing 
is required. In the case of mergers, these overpaid 
investments destroy the value of the firm 
(Malmendier & Tate, 2008), especially since 
overconfident CEOs have high-risk tolerance (Jiao et 
al., 2018). It has also shown that portfolio company 
takeover destroys the value of corporate venture 
capital shareholders (Benson & Ziedonis, 2010). Yim 
(2013) finds that overconfidence is only trumped 
when CEOs engage in successful mergers earlier in 
their career that ultimately leads to higher 
compensation for the remaining work life of the 
CEO. Billett and Quian (2008) find that the first 
participation in a merger leads to no effect on value 
but future mergers negatively affect value, which 
leads to self-attribution bias and overconfidence. 
These overconfident CEOs also issue less equity than 
their peers (Malmendier & Tate, 2011) do. These 
results are further exacerbated if the CEO is male 
since men are more overconfident than women 
(Huang & Kisgen, 2012) are. Together, these results 
show that extreme levels of overconfidence 
negatively affect the firm. While overconfidence 
pertains to extreme option-exercising behaviour, 
Lewellen (2006) finds the agency cost of debt is 
higher for CEOs with more stock and options. 
Generally, overconfidence is viewed negatively in the 
finance and management literature, but why do 
firms continue to find and hire overconfident CEOs? 
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) empirically show 
overconfident CEOs are extremely beneficial to 
innovative industries where growth opportunities 
can be exploited. More recent research has shown 
overconfident CEOs are better leaders in the sense 
they attract more long-lasting supplier relationships 
as well as employees who buy more stock in the 
company (Phua et al., 2018). According to their 
abstract, “by being intentionally overexposed to the 
idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs 
exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects”. We 
will examine this further in the Results section. 
Another compensation variable linked to 
reducing agency problems is CEO inside debt, which 
analyses the relative debt-to-equity ratio of the 
CEO’s compensation with the firm’s debt-to-equity 
ratio. The CEO receives debt in the form of deferred 
compensation and pension plans and equity in the 
form of stock and stock options (Rangarajan & 
Yermack, 2007). CEO inside debt is negatively 
associated with equity prices and positively 
associated with bond prices (Wei & Yermack, 2011). 
Loan yield spreads are lower if a non-commercial 
bank holds both debt and equity claims as a “dual 
holder” according to Jiang et al. (2010). Cassell et al. 
(2012) analyses the CEO inside debt ratio and finds 
higher inside debt leads to less risky decisions by 
the CEO in terms of lower volatility, leverage, higher 
diversification, and liquidity, which reduces the 
agency cost of debt. However, a recent study by 
Doukas and Mendal (2018) find compensation is not 
linked to a risk-reducing activity: hedging. They 
incorporate inside debt and also test this with CEO 
Vega and CEO Delta, which I use the ratio of these as 
a control in my tests alongside the other 
compensation variables. 
Although Bebchuk et al. (2011) uses the CEO 
Pay Slice to represent a proxy for CEO power, there 
has been a recent debate about if this is really the 
case. Bugeja et al. (2017) provide some indirect 
evidence of an efficient contracting theory whereby 
firms correct any overpay overtime if the firm does 
not perform well, and they show new CEOs do not 
have increasing or higher CPS over time when 
compared with the outgoing CEO. CPS also does not 
consider the pay distribution among the other top 
executives, and it often misestimates CEO power. 
Zagonov and Salganik-Shoshan (2018) suggest 
alternatives to supplement CPS, such as pay slice 
gap and non-CEO highest paid executive pay slice. 
Although this paper does not directly test these 
measures, I focus on the aspect that CPS is not 
enough by itself by including and interacting CPS 
with variables concerning inside debt and 
overconfidence. A recent study in the UK found CPS 
and firm value are negatively related (supporting 
social comparison theory) when the CEO is not about 
to retire (Tarkovska, 2017).  
With respect to agency costs, Edmans and Liu 
(2011) theorize inside debt efficiently reduces the 
agency cost of debt. White (2018) finds agency costs 
of debt are higher when the CPS is lower with 
respect to inside debt measured by pensions. Li et al. 
(2016) show the over-investment hypothesis of 
agency theory is true with respect to higher CPS 
yielding more investment in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Similarly, the over-investment 
hypothesis is true concerning overconfident CEOs 
and the agency cost of debt is higher when they seek 
external financing and a turnover occurs (Iyer et al., 
2017). Similar results hold in Chinese firms when 
overconfident CEOs overinvest, leading to higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, higher investment 
distortion, and higher agency costs (Huang et al., 
2011). However, none of these studies considers 
effects when all three are considered: CPS, inside 
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debt, and overconfidence demonstrated through 
stock and option compensation. 
Mitigating results should come from mixing 
compensation packages in the variety of ways 
discussed above. Generally, inside debt is viewed as 
reducing firm risk since this incentivizes the CEO 
with long-term incentives she will not earn if the 
firm no longer exists. Overconfidence and CPS have 
been demonstrated to show more CEO power and 
willingness to take on risk. Thus, this would lead us 
to believe a compounding effect will occur in 
situations where the CEO is both overconfident and 
paid more than other executives. Mitigation of this 
should occur if inside debt is higher, but Section 4 
will describe what actually occurs and which effect 
dominates or recedes from the others as each piece 
is considered in turn. These lead to three hypotheses 
concerning how variety in the compensation package 
affect agency issues with the firm. See Appendix B 
for hypothesized variable coefficients. 
Hypothesis 1: Higher CPS and higher 
overconfidence together further increase agency 
problems. 
Hypothesis 2: Higher CPS and higher inside debt 
mitigate agency problems. 
Hypothesis 3: Higher inside debt and higher 
overconfidence mitigate agency problems. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
CEO compensation data are derived from 
ExecuComp. Firm financials come from Compustat. 
Governance measures are calculated using Risk 
Metrics. Stock prices come from CRSP. Variable 
descriptions are in Appendix A. 
Variables of interest are directly derived from 
the existing literature. A CEO is considered 
overconfident if his stock and option behaviour is 
any of three indicators from Malmendier and Tate 
(2005). Longholder is CEO holds an option until the 
last year of its duration. Netbuyer is CEOs were net 
buyers of company equity during their first five 
years in the sample. Holder67 is CEOs who at least 
twice had options that were valued above 67% in the 
money during the fifth year to rule out information 
advantage. The CEO Pay Slice (CPS) is defined as the 
percentage of compensation that the CEO has 
compared to the top five executives listed in 
ExecuComp, as defined by Bebchuk et al. (2011).  
Finally, the four CEO inside debt variables are 
all derived from Cassell et al. (2012). CEO relative 
debt-to-equity (RDE) is the CEO’s inside debt 
holdings to equity holdings ratio divided by the 
firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. The inside debt holdings 
are calculated as the sum of the present value of the 
accumulated pension benefits and deferred 
compensation. Equity holdings are comprised of 
stock and stock options. Firm debt is equivalent to 
total current liabilities and long-term debt. Firm 
equity equals the market value of equity at the end 
of the fiscal year. Using Wei and Yermack (2011), the 
CEO relative incentive ratio (RIR) modifies CEO RDE 
by changing the equity holding values of the CEO 
and firm by using delta. The CEO’s holdings are 
calculated by multiplying her options by delta; the 
firm’s holdings are multiplied by the average 
exercise price of options times the number of 
employee options outstanding with an assumed 
remaining life of four years. Options are valued 
according to the Black-Scholes (1973) option-pricing 
model. The third debt variable is cash-adjusted (CEO 
RIRCA). First, the CEO’s expected decision horizon is 
calculated by adding the difference between the 
industry CEO age and her age and the difference 
between the industry CEO tenure and her tenure. If 
negative, use the current cash compensation. If 
positive, multiply the result by the current cash 
compensation. This number is added to the inside 
debt holdings and then follow the same procedure 
as stated above when constructing CEO RDE. As 
necessary, the delta is calculated for the various 
types of options (exercisable, not exercised, and 
unexercisable). Besides the extreme inside debt 
indicator variable (CEO RDE > 1), all inside debt 
ratios are transformed by the natural log. 
The summary statistics for the data described 
are in Table 1. 43.3% of the CEOs in the sample are 
considered overconfident. The average CEO receives 
more equity compensation than debt as 
demonstrated by average negative inside debt ratios 
transformed by the natural log. Only 15.1% of the 
CEOs in the sample period receive compensation 
such that they are heavily incentivized toward 
debtholder interests. 39% of the top five executive 
total compensation is paid to the average CEO. 
Panel B provides the correlation matrix with 
significant p-values listed below each correlation. 
The inside debt variables are significantly correlated 
with each other. Overconfidence is negatively 
correlated with three of the four inside debt 
variables; however, the correlations are all under -
0.06 so there is little concern for multicollinearity in 
the regression analysis in Section 4. CPS is not 
correlated with either inside debt nor 
overconfidence. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
I follow the literature and analyse the regressions 
used in Malmendier and Tate (2005), Bebchuk et al. 
(2011), and Cassell et al. (2012). There are two main 
differences between the regressions used in these 
papers and mine. First, I do not include the military 
and financial education indicators in the Malmendier 
and Tate (2005) models due to lack of data. Second, 
all of my models include the three compensation 
variables of interest and interactions among them in 
order to fully capture agency issues with the firm 
variables addressed in each paper. This will fully 
capture the effects of agency problems caused by or 
mitigated by the structure of the CEO’s 
compensation package and also provide better 
models that more robust to the issue of omitted 
variables. Note all models and regressions described 
in Section 4 use year and industry controls. All 
inferences made are based on errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm. The paper 
incorporates original models from the literature to 
demonstrate the variables are necessary including 
controlling for other CEO risk-taking and incentives 
with the CEO vega/delta ratio (Coles et al., 2006). 
Since this particular period includes the financial 
crisis, regressions include a dummy variable for the 
Crisis (2008 and 2009) and report it when it is not 
dropped out of models since year controls are 
included throughout all models. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 12733 55.021 8.919 
Annual Return 12733 0.004 0.186 
Abnormal Total Compensation 12733 -74.725 13238.380 
Book Value Per Share 12733 15273.940 345687.200 
Book Leverage 12733 0.352 1.156 
Capital Expenditures / Assets 12733 0.042 0.054 
Cash Flow 12446 1670.152 12596.760 
CEO Age > 60 12733 0.228 0.420 
CEO Outsider 12733 0.003 0.057 
CEO Ownership > 20% 12733 0.023 0.151 
CEO RDE > 1 12733 0.151 0.359 
CEO Vega/Delta 12733 0.004 0.100 
Chairman 12733 0.010 0.099 
Corporate Governance 12733 0.327 0.684 
CEO Pay Slice 12733 0.394 0.121 
Debt/Equity 12733 81.557 6182.727 
Depression Baby 12733 0.003 0.051 
Director Ownership 12733 0.002 0.026 
Diversified 12733 0.017 0.129 
E-index 12733 1.570 1.550 
Entropy 12733 1.600 1.662 
Firm Return 12733 0.017 0.118 
Founder 12733 0.070 0.254 
Idiosyncratic Risk 12733 1.938 2.002 
Industry-Adjusted CPS 12733 0.393 0.034 
Industry-Adjusted Tobin's Q 12733 1.302 0.405 
Investment 12451 560.151 4392.657 
Leverage 12733 0.268 1.524 
Liquidity Constraint 12733 0.045 0.208 
Log (Sales) 12733 7.200 1.898 
CEO RIRCA 12733 -1.112 2.805 
CEO RIR 12733 -1.522 3.065 
CEO RDE 12733 -0.646 2.411 
Log (Firm Age) 12733 1.060 1.264 
Longholder 12733 0.010 0.102 
Market Return 12733 0.017 0.022 
M/B 12732 1.480 21.316 
Net Buyer 12733 0.429 0.495 
Net Debt Issuance 12733 0.009 0.088 
Net Financing Deficit 12733 0.053 0.774 
# VPs 12733 2.546 1.320 
OC CEO 12733 0.433 0.495 
Holder67 12733 0.014 0.118 
President 12733 0.382 0.486 
Profitability 12733 0.103 0.443 
R&D 12733 0.086 1.807 
R&D/Sales 12733 0.037 0.961 
R&D Missing 12733 0.456 0.498 
Relative Equity Compensation 12733 0.338 1.548 
Return 12733 1.168 84.015 
ROA 12733 0.102 0.434 
Sales Growth 12669 196.580 10157.620 
Size 12733 7.669 2.014 
Stock Ownership 12733 0.019 0.057 
Tangibility 12733 0.223 0.232 
Tenure = 1 12733 0.055 0.228 
Tenure = 2 12733 0.108 0.452 
Tenure = 3 12733 0.153 0.660 
Tenure = 4 12733 0.187 0.845 
Tenure = 5 12733 0.217 1.018 
Tenure = 6 12733 0.220 1.127 
Tenure > 6 12733 1.416 2.548 
Tenure Missing 12733 0.431 0.495 
Tobin's Q 12733 1.639 1.203 
Total Book Leverage 12733 0.391 0.472 
Total Risk 12733 1.678 1.810 
Vested Options 12733 1208.222 43461.100 
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Panel B: Correlation matrix of variables of interest 
 
 
CEO RDE OC CEO CPS CEO RIRCA CEO RIR CEO RDE > 1 
CEO RDE 1 
     
OC CEO 
-0.057 
1     0*** 
    
CPS 
0.0083 0.0126 
1    1 1 
   
CEO RIRCA 
0.9496 -0.0516 0.0012 
1   0*** 0*** 1 
  
CEO RIR 
0.4717 -0.0604 0.0107 0.3802 
1  0*** 0*** 1 0*** 
 
CEO RDE > 1 
-0.0552 -0.0459 0.0224 -0.0605 0.3587 
1 
0*** 0*** 0.1725 0*** 0*** 
 
Table 2. Compensation and total risk 
 
Panel A: Instrumental variable models 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) CEO RDE CEO RDE > 1 CEO RIR CEO RIRCA 
Log (Total Assets) 
-0.077*** 0.020*** -0.401*** -0.363*** 
(0.018) (0.002) (0.024) (0.022) 
M/B Ratio 
0.001 0.000** 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log (Median D/E) 
0.737*** 0.114*** -0.069 -0.152** 
(0.080) (0.009) (0.082) (0.077) 
CEO Age 
-0.002 0.004*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
New CEO 
-0.139 -0.040** -0.261* 0.620*** 
(0.126) (0.018) (0.152) (0.136) 
Tax Status 
-0.034 -0.023 0.943*** 1.059*** 
(0.110) (0.015) (0.130) (0.122) 
State Tax Rate 
0.064*** -0.000 0.099*** 0.085*** 
(0.018) (0.002) (0.019) (0.018) 
Constant 
0.113*** -0.005** 0.303*** 0.318*** 
(0.018) (0.002) (0.026) (0.026) 
Observations 12,476 12,476 12,476 12,476 
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.037 0.069 0.049 
 
Panel B: Total risk 1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
-0.341***    -1.970*** 
   (0.076)    (0.614) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 -2.051***   
 
-2.742*** 





  0.064  
  
-0.617*** 





   0.274*** 
   
-0.146 
   (0.073) 
   
(0.132) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.134 -0.202** -0.079 -0.172** 
    (0.166) (0.083) (0.099) (0.076) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    1.608*** 0.445*** 1.019*** 0.122 
    (0.621) (0.172) (0.379) (0.192) 
OC*CPS 
    1.264** 0.263 0.700*** 0.347** 
    (0.532) (0.161) (0.263) (0.171) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    0.672*** 0.047 0.195*** 0.036 
    (0.219) (0.030) (0.071) (0.047) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    3.650*** 0.379*** 1.142*** 0.311 
    (1.201) (0.086) (0.372) (0.240) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.039 0.091 0.041 0.000 0.021 0.005 0.083 
 
Panel C: Total risk 2 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
-0.312***    -1.791*** 
   (0.067)    (0.552) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 -1.899***   
 
-2.540*** 





  0.078  
  
-0.458*** 





   0.240*** 
   
-0.104 
   (0.063) 
   
(0.117) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.105 -0.167** -0.075 -0.143** 
    (0.151) (0.075) (0.084) (0.067) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    1.429** 0.382*** 0.748** 0.068 
    (0.556) (0.146) (0.316) (0.168) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    0.607*** 0.039 0.140** 0.021 
    (0.197) (0.027) (0.060) (0.041) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    3.330*** 0.363*** 0.885*** 0.265 
    (1.080) (0.078) (0.312) (0.211) 
OC*CPS 
    1.042** 0.132 0.461** 0.197 
    (0.478) (0.139) (0.209) (0.141) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.138 0.216 0.151 0.000 0.104 0.112 0.212 
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Panel D: Idiosyncratic risk 1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
-0.438***    -2.589*** 
   (0.094)    (0.793) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 -2.724***   
 
-3.662*** 





  0.139  
  
-0.678*** 





   0.352*** 
   
-0.168 
   (0.086) 
   
(0.167) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.149 -0.239** -0.094 -0.192** 
    (0.214) (0.097) (0.112) (0.085) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    1.871** 0.355* 0.936** -0.062 
    (0.796) (0.196) (0.449) (0.230) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    0.884*** 0.063 0.216** 0.050 
    (0.283) (0.039) (0.086) (0.059) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    4.807*** 0.516*** 1.325*** 0.427 
    (1.553) (0.109) (0.448) (0.301) 
OC*CPS 
    1.509** 0.193 0.687** 0.308 
    (0.683) (0.181) (0.296) (0.187) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.057 0.143 0.075 0.000 0.027 0.024 0.136 
 
Panel E: Idiosyncratic risk 2 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
-0.295***    -1.562*** 
   (0.060)    (0.490) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 -1.774***   
 
-2.347*** 





  0.089  
  
-0.342** 





   0.200*** 
   
-0.076 
   (0.057) 
   
(0.107) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.142 -0.198*** -0.125 -0.177*** 
    (0.136) (0.075) (0.081) (0.069) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    1.291*** 0.402*** 0.587** 0.078 
    (0.496) (0.142) (0.296) (0.159) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    0.533*** 0.040 0.106* 0.015 
    (0.175) (0.025) (0.058) (0.039) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    2.898*** 0.328*** 0.657** 0.189 
    (0.956) (0.068) (0.291) (0.192) 
OC*CPS 
    1.042** 0.250* 0.491** 0.293** 
    (0.426) (0.147) (0.199) (0.148) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.158 0.223 0.184 0.000 0.131 0.165 0.226 
 
Table 2 provides regressions concerning 
compensation and total risk, defined as the volatility 
of daily firm returns from the current year. Panel A 
provides original baseline instrumental variable 
regressions. Cassell et al. (2012) describe and use 
this model as a test for endogeneity since CEO inside 
debt is jointly determined and dependent on CEO 
and firm characteristics as well as taxes (potential 
positive impact on the individual tax bill if they 
defer compensation in certain states and retirement 
situations) and industry practices. In the remaining 
regressions, the inside debt variables used are the 
instrumented ones.  
Panel B defines total risk as the volatility of 
daily firm returns from the current year. Columns 1-4 
provide baseline regressions given different 
definitions of inside debt. Columns 5-7 use 
instrumental variable regressions where inside debt 
is regressed on median inside debt levels, CEO age, 
tax status, and whether the firm made a profit or 
loss. Errors in brackets are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm. 
Significance is depicted by stars at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**), and 1% (***) levels. Inside debt remains negative 
and significant in three of the four models. 
Overconfidence is negative and significant in two 
models, which is contrary to the findings of Phua et 
al. (2018). Once again, this main be due to the 
inclusion of financials and utilities and due to the 
sample period occurring immediately following the 
Great Recession. The CEO Pay Slice is positive and 
significant in three of the four models. Each model 
has at least one interaction that is positive and 
significant. When computing all of the values 
together with Model 8, an overconfident CEO 
increases risk by 0.367%. This is mainly due to CPS 
offsetting the negative significance of 
overconfidence alone; thus, a higher CPS dominates 
the other compensation variables in this particular 
consideration of risk.  
Panel C defines total risk as the volatility of 
daily firm returns from the prior year. Panel D 
provides regressions of idiosyncratic risk, which is 
the volatility of daily firm residuals from the market 
model from the current year. Panel E provides 
regressions of idiosyncratic risk from the prior year. 
Panels C, D, and E provide similar results. The 
interactions with inside debt and the other variables 
of interest (overconfidence and CPS) are positive, 
which is consistent with Hypothesis 1. Thus, 
overconfident CEOs and a higher CPS increase firm 
risk. One interesting note is Crisis is negative and 
significant, which seems counterintuitive. However, 
the most recent Great Recession was of historic 
proportions and led to many behaviours and 
movements never seen before. Therefore, it is quite 
plausible this indicator is signalling this type of 
concern in the market could lead firms to behave 
less irrational and seek safety; in other words, they 
would become less risky during the period of risk 
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and be riskier during periods of less concern. This is 
an area for future research to see how managers react 
to situations post-Great Recession to see if these 
results still hold or if a paradigm shift has occurred. 
 
Table 3. Compensation effects on investment 
 
Panel A: R&D/Sales 1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
0.027***    0.086** 
   (0.006)    (0.041) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 0.001   
 
-0.090 





  0.070***  
  
0.037*** 





   0.048*** 
   
0.023*** 
   (0.019) 
   
(0.009) 
Overconfident CEO 
    0.012 0.012 0.007 0.011 
    (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    -0.109*** -0.018 -0.096*** -0.059*** 
    (0.038) (0.015) (0.026) (0.020) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    -0.027* 0.004* -0.011** -0.006** 
    (0.014) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    -0.157** 0.015 -0.063*** -0.038** 
    (0.077) (0.013) (0.022) (0.016) 
OC*CPS 
    -0.063** -0.017 -0.046* -0.033 
    (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: R&D/Sales 2 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
-0.010    -0.109 
   (0.052)    (0.292) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 -0.560   
 
-1.023* 





  0.202**  
  
0.216 





   0.197** 
   
0.213 
   (0.096) 
   
(0.134) 
Overconfident CEO 
    0.104 0.089 0.042 0.054 
    (0.065) (0.062) (0.048) (0.043) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    0.684 0.786* 0.270 0.406 
    (0.482) (0.475) (0.379) (0.376) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    0.040 0.019 -0.082 -0.090 
    (0.097) (0.014) (0.056) (0.059) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    0.199 0.141* -0.343 -0.316 
    (0.547) (0.082) (0.265) (0.208) 
OC*CPS 
    -0.518 -0.564* -0.715* -0.687* 
    (0.372) (0.338) (0.403) (0.383) 
Observations 12,363 12,363 12,363 12,363 12,363 12,363 12,363 12,363 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel C: Investment  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Overconfident CEO 
-121.927* -21.114 -71.849 -61.963 -56.825 
(73.592) (95.211) (99.644) (102.053) (98.172) 
OC*CF 
0.081** 0.081** 0.082** 0.081** 0.081** 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
CEO RDE  
-3.799 
   
 
(10.993) 
   






CEO RIR    
6.582 
 
   
(9.351) 
 
CEO RIRCA     
4.449 
    
(7.951) 
CEO Pay Slice  
71.847 70.256 90.952 84.454 
 
(200.541) (215.468) (213.753) (207.887) 
OC*Inside Debt  
22.082 217.814* -13.691 -14.230 
 
(14.235) (114.347) (10.592) (10.155) 
CPS*Inside Debt  
-3.869 101.575 17.782 19.931 
 
(16.417) (140.441) (19.551) (18.616) 
OC*CPS  
-256.365 -258.735 -245.415 -246.112 
 
(172.601) (173.178) (168.043) (168.564) 
Crisis  
-44.911 -49.944 -40.414 -39.905 
 
(92.755) (91.771) (91.301) (91.679) 
Constant 
-184.719** -239.313*** -236.479** -263.256** -255.304** 
(82.808) (92.568) (98.660) (103.116) (99.509) 
Observations 12,164 12,164 12,164 12,164 12,164 
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 
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Table 3 provides models of compensation and 
investment. This table provides an analysis of 
compensation variables with respect to investment. 
Panel A uses current research and development 
expense scaled by net sales as its dependent 
variable. In three of the four new models, inside debt 
is positive and significant. This is the exact opposite 
finding of Cassell et al. (2012), and this may be a by-
product of this paper having more data and 
including financials and utilities to include a larger 
sample. In addition, their sample occurred right 
before and during the financial crisis. 
Overconfidence is negative and significant only in 
interactions. CPS is negative and significant in three 
models. Using Model 8, an overconfident CEO affects 
investment only by 0.3%. Thus, only inside debt and 
CPS play a role. Higher inside debt increases 
investment, whereas higher CPS reduces investment.  
Panel B defines investment as prior year 
research and development expense over sales. 
Results are not significant in Panel B with lagged 
R&D. Panel C defines investment as current year 
capital expenditure divided by common stock. Using 
the investment model from Malmendier and Tate 
(2005), we see no significant effects except for Model 
3 in extreme cases of inside debt. Thus, in general, 
the results are not conclusive regarding incentive 
structures around investment in times of crisis, 
although there is some evidence according to the 
current models suggesting from the interactions the 
amount falls in the presence of overconfidence and 
higher compensation relative to other executives. 
 
Table 4. Compensation and diversification 
 
Panel A: Entropy 1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
0.088*    0.561* 
   
(0.051)    (0.298) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 


















   0.023 
   
0.460*** 
   (0.030) 
   
(0.100) 
Overconfident CEO 
    0.001 0.021 -0.078 -0.019 
    (0.065) (0.056) (0.080) (0.067) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    -0.445* -0.119 -1.014*** -0.487*** 
    (0.238) (0.080) (0.261) (0.158) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    -0.181* -0.003 -0.187*** -0.136*** 
    (0.101) (0.008) (0.049) (0.037) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    -1.033* -0.106* -1.093*** -0.840*** 
    (0.565) (0.057) (0.247) (0.181) 
OC*CPS 
    -0.340 -0.056 -0.498*** -0.349** 
    (0.217) (0.068) (0.191) (0.139) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.042 0.045 0.045 0.005 0.039 0.000 0.011 
 
Panel B: Entropy 2 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
0.081    0.500* 
   
(0.050)    (0.291) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 


















   -0.028 
   
0.385*** 
   (0.030) 
   
(0.088) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.082 -0.064 -0.155 -0.094 
    (0.130) (0.133) (0.144) (0.136) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    -0.662*** -0.378*** -1.152*** -0.676*** 
    (0.207) (0.108) (0.250) (0.177) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    -0.171* -0.013* -0.170*** -0.118*** 
    (0.096) (0.007) (0.044) (0.032) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    -0.907 -0.084 -0.952*** -0.702*** 
    (0.556) (0.065) (0.228) (0.160) 
OC*CPS 
    -0.022 0.232 -0.158 -0.019 
    (0.410) (0.281) (0.334) (0.302) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.064 0.065 0.066 0.024 0.061 0.010 0.036 
 
Compensation and diversification are next. 
Panel A defines diversification as the current year 
proportion of industry sales transformed by the 
natural log. Panel B defines diversification as the 
previous year proportion of industry sales 
transformed by the natural log. Inside debt is 
positive and significant in the last four models. 
Overconfidence only plays a role in the interactions. 
CPS is negative and significant by itself and in the 
interactions. According to Model 6, an overconfident 
CEO contributes 0.619% to diversified sales, with the 
majority coming from the model’s constant term. 
Thus, CEOs with more inside debt diversify sales 
more, but overconfident CEOs paid more than the 
rest of upper management diversify sales less. The 
story holds with higher CPS too. Thus, H2 and H3 do 
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not hold in this case for diversification. The use of 
inside debt fails to mitigate in the case of 
diversification. Panel B defines diversification as the 
previous year proportion of industry sales 
transformed by the natural log. Similar results are 
shown in Panel B. 
 
Table 5. Compensation and liquidity 
 
Panel A: Working capital 1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
0.056***    0.159** 
   (0.014)    (0.075) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 0.051   
 
-0.107 





  0.143***  
  
0.213*** 





   0.083*** 
   
0.150*** 
   (0.014) 
   
(0.034) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.011 -0.010 -0.042** -0.020 
    (0.015) (0.011) (0.021) (0.016) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    -0.128** 0.029 -0.330*** -0.143** 
    (0.063) (0.031) (0.085) (0.058) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    -0.053** 0.003 -0.068*** -0.047*** 
    (0.026) (0.003) (0.016) (0.012) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    -0.280** 0.031*** -0.353*** -0.242*** 
    (0.142) (0.012) (0.081) (0.062) 
OC*CPS 
    -0.115* -0.031 -0.184*** -0.124*** 
    (0.066) (0.029) (0.066) (0.044) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.463 0.002 0.290 0.252 0.464 0.081 0.282 
 
Panel B: Working capital 2 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
0.192    0.591 
   (0.236)    (1.128) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 0.488   
 
0.313 





  0.291*  
  
0.227 





   0.151* 
   
0.048 
   (0.086) 
   
(0.238) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.114 -0.100 -0.151 -0.091 
    (0.146) (0.115) (0.195) (0.144) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    -0.709 -0.262 -0.569 -0.271 
    (0.919) (0.215) (0.591) (0.244) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    -0.227 -0.031 -0.091 -0.020 
    (0.388) (0.028) (0.134) (0.086) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    -1.042 0.011 -0.365 -0.076 
    (2.113) (0.174) (0.687) (0.436) 
OC*CPS 
    -0.278 0.028 -0.138 -0.018 
    (0.626) (0.298) (0.400) (0.347) 
Observations 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel C:  Leverage 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
-0.046***    -0.271** 
   (0.014)    (0.107) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 -0.331***   
 
-0.445*** 





  0.042**  
  
-0.157*** 





   0.059*** 
   
-0.081*** 
   (0.016) 
   
(0.027) 
Overconfident CEO 
    -0.016 -0.027* 0.003 -0.018 
    (0.024) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    0.181* 0.034 0.208*** 0.037 
    (0.097) (0.042) (0.076) (0.062) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    0.095** 0.010*** 0.052*** 0.026*** 
    (0.038) (0.004) (0.014) (0.009) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    0.487** 0.045*** 0.266*** 0.135*** 
    (0.207) (0.015) (0.069) (0.049) 
OC*CPS 
    0.173* 0.036 0.148** 0.086** 
    (0.098) (0.044) (0.064) (0.042) 
Observations 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 12,384 
Adjusted R2 0.488 0.476 0.454 0.407 0.116 0.439 0.318 0.486 
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Panel D: Leverage 1 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO RDE 
-0.181    -0.530 
   (0.236)    (1.128) 
   
CEO RDE > 1 
 -0.466   
 
-0.292 





  -0.244  
  
-0.175 





   -0.120 
   
0.024 
   (0.089) 
   
(0.243) 
Overconfident CEO 
    0.069 0.057 0.095 0.039 
    (0.146) (0.116) (0.195) (0.145) 
CEO Pay Slice 
    0.601 0.203 0.449 0.153 
    (0.923) (0.236) (0.593) (0.248) 
OC*Inside Debt 
    0.202 0.027 0.071 -0.007 
    (0.388) (0.028) (0.135) (0.088) 
CPS*Inside Debt 
    0.930 -0.011 0.295 -0.030 
    (2.113) (0.175) (0.695) (0.447) 
OC*CPS 
    0.316 0.042 0.178 0.049 
    (0.628) (0.305) (0.410) (0.356) 
Observations 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 12,377 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel E: Book leverage 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO RDE  
-0.014*** 
   
 
(0.005) 
   






CEO RIR    
-0.010** 
 
   
(0.005) 
 
CEO RIRCA     
-0.012*** 
    
(0.004) 
CEO Pay Slice  
-0.036 -0.048 -0.050 -0.049 
 
(0.053) (0.058) (0.056) (0.056) 
Overconfident CEO 
0.009 -0.010 -0.016 -0.004 -0.002 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) 
OC*Inside Debt  
0.004 0.016 0.006 0.009 
 
(0.006) (0.042) (0.006) (0.006) 
CPS*Inside Debt  
0.003 0.171** -0.009 -0.013* 
 
(0.010) (0.073) (0.008) (0.008) 
OC*CPS  
0.061 0.063 0.061 0.058 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
Observations 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Compensation and liquidity are considered 
next. This table provides an analysis of 
compensation variables with respect to liquidity. 
Panel A defines liquidity as the current year current 
assets less current liabilities, i.e., the current 
working capital. In three of the four models, inside 
debt is positive and significant. Overconfidence 
remains negative but only significant in its term by 
itself once and consistently negative and significant 
in the interactions. CPS is negative and significant in 
the majority of the models. Panel B defines liquidity 
as the previous year current assets less current 
liabilities. Significance falls away in Panel B. Panel C 
defines leverage as the current long-term debt scaled 
by assets. Panel C yields the opposite results for 
inside debt and CPS. Panel D defines liquidity as the 
prior long-term debt scaled by assets. Once again, in 
Panel D, the significance goes away. Panel E defines 
liquidity as the prior year’s sum of total long-term 
liabilities and total current liabilities scaled by the 
numerator plus stockholder’s equity. Panel E only 
has negative significance for inside debt. Thus, when 
considering liquidity through the lens of short-term 
capital, inside debt is positively related and CPS is 
negatively related. When considering liquidity 
through the lens of long-term capital, the result only 
remains significant for inside debt, but the result is 
flipped: inside debt tends to reduce leverage in the 
long-term. 
Net financing deficit, defined as dividends plus 
the change in inventory plus the change in net 
working capital less net income scaled by total 
assets, is considered next in Table 6. The first model 
provides the baseline from Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) with the subsequent Models 2-5 adding in the 
various interaction terms. I find that two of the four 
models (Models 3 and 5) have positive significance 
with the overconfidence and inside debt indicator. In 
all models, overconfidence and the net financing 
deficit interaction term are positive and significantly 
correlated at the 1% level. Thus, overconfidence is 
the main driver of the net financing deficit.  
 
 




Table 6. Compensation and net financing deficit 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Overconfident CEO 
-0.043*** -0.009 -0.014 -0.006 -0.006 
(0.010) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) 
CEO RDE  
0.001 
   
 
(0.002) 
   






CEO RIR    
-0.004 
 
   
(0.004) 
 
CEO RIRCA     
-0.004 
    
(0.003) 
CPS  
0.046 0.059 0.054 0.050 
 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.054) (0.052) 
OC*Inside Debt  
0.000 0.035*** 0.003 0.004** 
 
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
CPS*Inside Debt  
0.000 -0.082 0.008 0.007 
 
(0.005) (0.050) (0.006) (0.005) 
OC*CPS  
-0.102 -0.106 -0.100 -0.100 
 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.078) (0.079) 
OC*NFD 
0.985*** 0.984*** 0.985*** 0.985*** 0.985*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
 
Table 7. Compensation and firm value 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
CEO Pay Slice Ind-Adj Tobin’s Q Ind-Adj Tobin’s Q Ind-Adj Tobin’s Q Ind-Adj Tobin’s Q Ind-Adj Tobin’s Q 
CEO Pay Slice 
 -0.112*** -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.147*** -0.141*** 









   




















    
0.008*** 
 






-0.018** -0.019*** -0.015** -0.016** 
 
 





-0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 





-0.012*** 0.024 -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 
 




0.061*** 0.067*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Observations 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 
Adjusted R2 0.470 0.746 0.748 0.746 0.748 0.748 
 
Firm value, defined as industry-adjusted 
Tobin’s Q, is considered in Table 7. Model 1 
demonstrates the CPS instrumented variable 
regression. Model 2 is the original baseline. Models 
3-6 are the models with the additional interactions. 
CPS is negative and significant throughout. 
Overconfidence is negative and significant. Besides 
CEO RDE > 1, inside debt is positive and significant. 
With respect to the interactions, CPS and inside debt 
are negative and significant, but CPS and 
overconfidence are positive and significant, 
suggesting the two mitigate each other in this 
instead of exacerbating each other. 
 
Table 8. Compensation and ROA 
 
Panel A: ROA 1 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
CPS 
-0.140 -0.193 -0.205 -0.201 -0.195 
(0.122) (0.170) (0.177) (0.176) (0.171) 
CEO RDE  
0.005 
   
 
(0.004) 
   






CEO RIR    
0.011* 
 
   
(0.006) 
 
CEO RIRCA     
0.012* 
    
(0.006) 
Overconfident CEO  
-0.046 -0.049 -0.042 -0.043 
 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.034) (0.035) 
OC*Inside Debt  
0.000 0.013 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
CPS*Inside Debt  
-0.005 0.094 -0.013 -0.010 
 
(0.006) (0.080) (0.010) (0.008) 
OC*CPS  
0.133 0.136 0.127 0.131 
 
(0.119) (0.122) (0.116) (0.118) 
Observations 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Panel B: ROA 2 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
CPS 
-0.295 -0.411 -0.453 -0.417 -0.402 
(0.236) (0.334) (0.367) (0.340) (0.329) 
CEO RDE  
0.007 
   
 
(0.005) 
   






CEO RIR    
0.014* 
 
   
(0.008) 
 
CEO RIRCA     
0.014* 
    
(0.008) 
Overconfident CEO  
-0.088 -0.096 -0.081 -0.082 
 
(0.067) (0.073) (0.063) (0.064) 
OC*Inside Debt  
0.000 0.011 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.013) (0.002) (0.002) 
CPS*Inside Debt  
-0.012 0.192 -0.023 -0.017 
 
(0.011) (0.154) (0.017) (0.014) 
OC*CPS  
0.266 0.286 0.252 0.254 
 
(0.219) (0.236) (0.211) (0.211) 
Observations 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 12,449 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), I analyse 
compensation effects on return using return on 
assets (ROA), defined as net income scaled by total 
assets. Panel A provides models using current ROA. 
I only find a significant positive effect for inside 
debt after adjusting for the CEO’s expected decision 
horizon. None of the interactions among the 
compensation variables are significant. Panel B, 
which uses lagged ROA, provides similar results. 
Thus, the net effect of the compensation incentives 
shows that inside debt (when considering cash-
adjusted compensation) positively affects firm 
return in the form of higher ROA. 
 
Table 9. Compensation and CEO turnover 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEO RDE  
-0.111 
   
 
(0.163) 
   






CEO RIR    
-0.040 
 
   
(0.188) 
 
CEO RIRCA     
-0.050 
    
(0.183) 
CEO Pay Slice 
0.336 0.559 -0.581 0.299 0.242 
(1.383) (1.272) (1.551) (1.380) (1.278) 
CPS*Inside Debt  
0.256 9.043** -0.004 -0.039 
 
(0.437) (3.822) (0.504) (0.491) 
Stock Return * CPS 
-30.795 -15.945 -5.757 -18.897 -18.901 
(46.982) (50.191) (50.763) (50.364) (50.738) 
Firm Return * CPS 
21.275 6.568 -3.081 8.654 8.648 
(57.782) (60.694) (60.854) (60.259) (60.646) 
Market Return * CPS 
12.040 -6.323 -34.530 -4.819 -5.538 
(54.128) (60.289) (61.631) (58.942) (58.375) 
Observations 2,262 1,425 1,425 1,425 1,425 
Pseudo R2 0.286 0.271 0.285 0.271 0.271 
 
Finally, CEO turnover, which indicates if there 
was a change in the CEO position of a firm within 
the past year, is considered using logistic 
regressions. Model 1 provides the original baseline 
regression for the instrumented CPS that is used in 
the remaining models. The overconfidence indicator 
and crisis indicator were included in the regressions 
but both were dropped due to multicollinearity with 
the CEO turnover indicator. The only significance 
occurred with Model 3 with negative significance 
with CEO RDE > 1 and the interaction between CPS 
and inside debt was positive and significant. Thus, 
extreme inside debt reduced the likelihood of 
turnover by almost 50% (when comparing 
magnitudes with the constant), but a higher CPS 
doubled the likelihood of turnover and cancelled out 
this effect. Interestingly, the CPS in the baseline 




Considering other variables in corporate finance 
research is necessary to complete the picture of how 
the firm is affected by CEO compensation incentives. 
Inside debt is negatively related to a firm’s total risk, 
idiosyncratic risk, and CEO turnover and positively 
related to diversification, liquidity, firm value, and 
return. Overconfidence is negatively related to total 
risk, liquidity, and firm value and positively related 
to investment. The CEO pay slice is positively related 
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to total risk and CEO turnover and negatively related 
to investment, diversification, liquidity, and firm 
value. Interactions among these variables are 
positively related to total risk and negatively related 
to investment, diversification, liquidity, and firm 
value. Overall, agency costs are more likely to 
increase as the CEO pay slice increases and if the 
CEO is overconfident. However, in a time of crisis, 
the total risk of the firm will decline if the proper 
compensation package is used and it turns out the 
CEO is overconfident. This may be another reason 
(besides innovation) why firms continue to want and 
hire overconfident executives. They are timely and 
good in not only times of wanted growth but also in 
times of dire need or crisis as demonstrated by 
some evidence in this paper. It is also more likely to 
increase as the percentage of CEO inside debt 
relative to the firm declines.  
This research does have limitations that may 
provide interesting studies in the future. First, 
military information was not available for CEOs but 
was used in the Malmendier and Tate (2005) study. 
Another paper could relook at these effects and 
consider this type of experience with regards to 
overconfidence and the other compensation 
variables. Specifically, attempt to answer the 
question if military experiences affect compensation 
packages and if they are different than the non-
military CEO population. Second, this study focuses 
on U.S. data and does not consider the issues from 
an international context. A future paper could 
consider international environments similar to the 
U.S. to see if the results hold. Lastly, I exclusively 
focus on CPS instead of other alternatives, such as 
the pay slice gap or non-CEO highest paid executive 
pay slice. It would be interesting to see how 
overconfident CEOs’ pay structures vary with these 
structures and if the gap is larger or smaller when 
controlling for inside debt.  
In conclusion, inside debt mitigates the risky 
decision making of a CEO, whereas CEOs who are 
deemed overconfident by their option exercise 
behaviour or their relative compensation to other 
directors creates a situation where they are 
encouraged to take on more risk (in the presence of 
higher CPS), which is shown to harm the firm. Future 
research should further analyse the compensation 
package to determine what is optimal and look at 
these effects after the litigation changes resulting 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Age CEO age in given year 
Annual Return Ln (stock return + 1) 
Abnormal Total 
Compensation 
Regression residual of total executive compensation on the lag of book value + year & industry 
fixed effects 
Book Value Per Share Stockholder's equity / common shares outstanding 
Capital Expenditures / 
Assets 
Capital expenditures / total assets 
Cash Flow Operating income before depreciation / common stock 
Cash Surplus 
Net cash flow from operations less depreciation expense plus research and development 
expenses, scaled by total assets 
CEO Age > 60 CEO’s age > 60 
CEO Outsider CEO, not an employee 2 years before becoming CEO 
CEO Ownership > 20% CEO's stock ownership > 20% 
CEO RDE > 1 CEO RDE > 1 
CEO Vega/Delta 
Option sensitivity to changes in the stock volatility/option sensitivity to changes in the stock 
price 
Chairman CEO = Chairman 
Corporate Governance # outside CEO-directors on the board 
CEO Pay Slice Total CEO compensation / the total executive compensation of the top 5 executives 
Debt/Equity (Long-term debt + current liabilities) / total stockholder's equity 
Depression Baby CEO born in the 1920s 
Director Ownership Total stock ownership of directors / total common equity 
Diversified The firm has multiple sale segments 
E-index Governance index from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
Entropy Natural log of the inverse of the sum of segment proportions 
Firm Return Firm daily return - value-weighted market return 
Founder CEO is a company founder 
Idiosyncratic Risk The standard deviation of firm annual stock returns 
Industry-Adjusted CPS Median CPS of a firm's industry, classified by two-digit SIC 
Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q Median Tobin's Q of a firm's industry, classified by two-digit SIC 
Investment Capital expenditures / common stock 
Leverage Long-term debt / total assets 
Liquidity Constraint Net income < 0 
Log (Sales) Ln (net sales) 
CEO RIRCA 
Ln [CEO RIR * CEO's expected decision horizon], where the CEO’s expected decision horizon = 
(CEO age – industry median CEO age) – (CEO tenure – industry median CEO tenure) 
CEO RIR 
Ln [(pension value + deferred compensation) / (market value of stock owned & option value 
calculated with delta)] / [(current liabilities + long-term debt) / (employee average option price * 
total employee options owned)] 
CEO RDE 
Ln [(pension value + deferred compensation) / (option value + stock value)] / [(current liabilities + 
long-term debt) / (common shares outstanding * fiscal-year end stock price)] 
Log (Firm Age) Log (Company age) from Compustat 
Longholder CEO holds an option 40% in the money in its final year before expiration 
Market Return Value-weighted market return 
M/B End-of-the-year fiscal stock price * common shares outstanding / stockholder's equity 
Net Buyer CEO buys more stock in a given year than sells 
Net Debt Issuance (Total debt issued - total debt reduction) / by total assets 
Net Financing Deficit (Dividends + change in inventory + change in net working capital - net income) / total assets 
# VPs Number of Vice Presidents in the firm 
OC CEO CEO is either a longholder, a holder67, or a net buyer 
Holder67 CEO holds an option 67% in the money 5 years before expiration 
President CEO = President 
Profitability Operating income before depreciation / net income 
R&D Research and development expense 
R&D/Sales R&D / net sales 
R&D Missing R&D expense missing 
Relative Equity 
Compensation 
(Unvested stock value + option awards) / total compensation of the top 5 executives 
Return Daily stock return 
ROA Operating income before depreciation / net income 
Sales Growth % change in yearly net sales 
Size Ln (total assets) 
Stock Ownership % shares owned excluding options 
Tangibility (PPE – depreciation) / total assets 
Tenure = 1 CEO tenure = 1 
Tenure = 2 CEO tenure = 2 
Tenure = 3 CEO tenure = 3 
Tenure = 4 CEO tenure = 4 
Tenure = 5 CEO tenure = 5 
Tenure = 6 CEO tenure = 6 
Tenure > 6 CEO tenure > 6 
Tenure Missing CEO tenure missing 
Tobin's Q (Market value + assets - common equity & tax before depreciation) / assets 
Total Book Leverage (Current liabilities + long-term debt) / (common equity + current liabilities + long-term debt) 
Total Risk The standard deviation of market annual stock returns 
Vested Options Vested shares / common shares outstanding *10 
Working Capital Current assets - current liabilities 
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(Malmendier & Tate, 
2005) 
CEO Pay Slice 
(Bebchuk et al., 
2011) 
Inside Debt (Cassell 




and Inside Debt 
CPS and 
Inside Debt 
Investment + +* - +* Net 0* Net 0* 
Firm Value -* - +* -* Net 0* Net 0* 
Profitability -* - +* -* Net 0* Net 0* 
Stock Returns -* - -* -* -* -* 
CEO Turnover 
PPS 
-* - +* -* Net 0* Net 0* 
Volatility +* +* - +* Net 0* Net 0* 
Leverage +/- +* - Net 0 or +* Net 0 or -* Net 0* 
Diversification -* -* + -* Net 0* Net 0* 
Liquidity -* -* + -* Net 0* Net 0* 
Note: * indicates hypothesized 
 
Appendix C. Remaining portions of the tables 
 
Table 2. Panel B 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
-0.026** 0.021** 0.016 0.073*** -2.490 0.612*** -0.201 0.131 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.023) (0.022) (1.971) (0.147) (0.351) (0.119) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.097*** 0.022 -0.088*** -0.067*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
Log (Firm Age) 
-1.259** 0.085 0.321** 0.500** 0.019 -0.038 0.076** 0.034 
(0.641) (0.110) (0.161) (0.208) (0.037) (0.024) (0.033) (0.025) 
Log (Total Assets) 
-0.098*** -0.011 -0.059*** -0.053*** -0.046** 0.037*** -0.051** -0.012 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.020) (0.012) (0.021) (0.015) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.002 -0.034 0.007 -0.046 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
-0.037 -0.100 -0.135 -0.222 0.008 -0.118 -0.007 -0.090 
(0.043) (0.067) (0.103) (0.157) (0.054) (0.082) (0.048) (0.072) 
Crisis 
    -1.955*** -2.109*** -2.069*** -2.174*** 
    (0.100) (0.061) (0.073) (0.060) 
Constant 
0.233*** 0.215*** 0.238*** 0.237*** -0.692** -0.028 -0.350 0.156 
(0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.348) (0.102) (0.215) (0.113) 
 
Table 2. Panel C 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
-1.163** 0.066 0.316** 0.436** -2.262 0.566*** -0.108 0.132 
(0.574) (0.101) (0.154) (0.192) (1.786) (0.150) (0.261) (0.100) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
-0.085*** -0.005 -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.083*** 0.026 -0.070*** -0.056*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) 
Log (Firm Age) 
0.010 -0.021 0.014 -0.029 0.029 -0.024 0.071** 0.038 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.023) (0.028) (0.023) 
Log (Total Assets) 
-0.028** 0.016 0.016 0.061*** -0.046** 0.031*** -0.040** -0.010 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
0.006 -0.051 -0.093 -0.159 0.046 -0.068 0.013 -0.050 
(0.035) (0.054) (0.093) (0.133) (0.046) (0.068) (0.044) (0.063) 
Crisis 
    -1.971*** -2.110*** -2.092*** -2.171*** 
    (0.090) (0.056) (0.064) (0.055) 
Constant 
-1.010*** -1.027*** -1.006*** -1.006*** -1.834*** -1.235*** -1.440*** -1.056*** 





Corporate Board: Role, Duties & Composition / Volume 14, Issue 3, 2018 
 
39 
Table 2. Panel D 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
-1.661** 0.058 0.461** 0.596** -3.313 0.773*** -0.193 0.150 
(0.798) (0.133) (0.223) (0.276) (2.569) (0.208) (0.376) (0.137) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
-0.119*** -0.005 -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.116*** 0.042 -0.097*** -0.076*** 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.024) (0.025) (0.017) (0.014) 
Log (Firm Age) 
-0.043 -0.086*** -0.042 -0.100*** -0.015 -0.091*** 0.045 -0.003 
(0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.031) (0.047) (0.028) (0.039) (0.030) 
Log (Total Assets) 
-0.035** 0.026** 0.034 0.092*** -0.063** 0.048*** -0.053** -0.010 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.015) (0.025) (0.019) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
0.016 -0.064 -0.137 -0.222 0.072 -0.094 0.022 -0.069 
(0.043) (0.047) (0.107) (0.157) (0.062) (0.065) (0.054) (0.061) 
Crisis 
    -1.802*** -2.003*** -1.970*** -2.087*** 
    (0.121) (0.066) (0.081) (0.065) 
Constant 
-1.137*** -1.161*** -1.133*** -1.131*** -2.233*** -1.366*** -1.692*** -1.128*** 
(0.064) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.445) (0.118) (0.255) (0.136) 
 
Table 2. Panel E 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
-1.247** -0.085 0.174 0.234 -2.116 0.369** -0.198 -0.017 
(0.492) (0.078) (0.165) (0.197) (1.506) (0.148) (0.172) (0.082) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
-0.065*** 0.010 -0.027** -0.029*** -0.062*** 0.038** -0.049*** -0.038*** 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) 
Log (Firm Age) 
0.030 0.002 0.031 -0.000 0.048 -0.001 0.080*** 0.055** 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) 
Log (Total Assets) 
-0.040*** 0.001 0.005 0.036** -0.054*** 0.014 -0.045*** -0.023* 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
0.009 -0.046 -0.092 -0.135 0.040 -0.061 0.003 -0.044 
(0.037) (0.055) (0.096) (0.121) (0.047) (0.068) (0.050) (0.063) 
Crisis 
    0.397*** 0.280*** 0.279*** 0.219*** 
    (0.069) (0.033) (0.043) (0.031) 
Constant 
-0.708*** -0.724*** -0.705*** -0.704*** -1.450*** -0.942*** -1.045*** -0.757*** 
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.277) (0.080) (0.167) (0.090) 
 
Table 3. Panel A 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
0.111** -0.003 0.115* 0.047 0.120 0.016 0.025 0.011 
(0.051) (0.005) (0.063) (0.035) (0.098) (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
0.003 0.001 0.011*** 0.004 0.003 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log (Firm Age) 
0.019*** 0.018*** 0.004 0.006** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.015*** 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Log (Total Assets) 
0.001 -0.001 0.018*** 0.012** 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
M/B Ratio 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
-0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
-0.019 -0.014 -0.048 -0.034 -0.020 -0.015 -0.021 -0.018 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.046) (0.038) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.028) 
Crisis 
    -0.003 0.011 0.000 0.005 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) 
Constant 
-0.006 -0.007 -0.009 -0.007 0.053** 0.001 0.046*** 0.025*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.025) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008) 
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Table 3. Panel B 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
-0.110 -0.103 0.274 0.139 -0.228 0.075 0.087 0.054 
(0.223) (0.066) (0.189) (0.141) (0.408) (0.094) (0.139) (0.117) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
-0.017 -0.000 0.014 -0.005 -0.018 0.017 -0.007 -0.014 
(0.030) (0.025) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.024) (0.031) (0.029) 
Log (Firm Age) 
0.048 0.034 0.010 0.001 0.049 0.026 0.029 0.027 
(0.034) (0.030) (0.025) (0.020) (0.034) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) 
Log (Total Assets) 
0.012 0.019 0.067** 0.066** 0.010 0.027 0.032* 0.032* 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.018) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
-0.009 -0.010 -0.109 -0.096 0.009 -0.002 -0.036 -0.028 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.100) (0.092) (0.022) (0.021) (0.049) (0.042) 
Crisis 
    0.039 0.044 -0.010 0.006 
    (0.068) (0.051) (0.070) (0.057) 
Constant 
-0.062* -0.069* -0.069* -0.064* -0.397 -0.456* -0.163 -0.237 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.274) (0.264) (0.216) (0.209) 
 
Table 3. Panel C 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cash Flow 
0.733*** 0.733*** 0.732*** 0.733*** 0.733*** 
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) 
Tobin’s Q 
-142.253 -151.974 -154.825 -151.630 -149.213 
(165.474) (166.561) (164.649) (166.526) (166.453) 
Stock Ownership 
-416.825 -414.827 -454.791 -409.039 -407.058 
(668.934) (665.006) (668.839) (662.358) (661.127) 
Vested Options 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 
28.089** 29.025** 29.622** 30.891** 29.879** 
(11.897) (11.958) (11.925) (12.542) (12.353) 
Corporate Governance 
-33.368 -32.722 -26.082 -31.772 -31.872 
(36.915) (38.091) (38.596) (36.393) (36.443) 
Stock*CF 
0.958 0.961 0.955 0.958 0.959 
(1.053) (1.055) (1.055) (1.056) (1.056) 
Vested*CF 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size*CF 
-0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
CorpGov*CF 
-0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 -0.053 
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Chairman 
258.912 257.513 247.828 259.224 257.865 
(335.579) (335.601) (334.484) (335.294) (335.302) 
President 
-41.393 -42.427 -36.569 -39.151 -40.281 
(62.548) (61.859) (62.733) (62.462) (61.759) 
Depression Baby 
527.945 527.750 529.832 530.220 529.146 
(453.057) (453.778) (453.656) (454.454) (454.210) 
CEO Tenure 
-0.003 -0.113 0.382 0.178 0.219 
(13.179) (13.180) (13.236) (13.164) (13.138) 
 
Table 4. Panel A 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
0.424 0.082 0.018 0.068 0.829 -0.058 0.457 0.304 
(0.274) (0.052) (0.071) (0.055) (0.679) (0.076) (0.343) (0.240) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
-0.004 -0.028** -0.014 -0.010 -0.002 -0.037** 0.011 -0.008 
(0.007) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.008) 
Log (Firm Age) 
-0.027** -0.017 -0.030** -0.038*** -0.031** -0.015 -0.088*** -0.077*** 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) 
Log (Total Assets) 
0.078*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.060*** 0.122*** 0.110*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000* -0.001** -0.000* -0.000** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
0.000* 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
-0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
0.007 0.023 0.031 0.014 -0.009 0.027 -0.076 -0.035 
(0.019) (0.022) (0.033) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.050) (0.030) 
Crisis 
    1.474*** 1.517*** 1.419*** 1.477*** 
    (0.043) (0.036) (0.052) (0.045) 
Constant 
0.637*** 0.643*** 0.636*** 0.635*** 0.894*** 0.707*** 1.214*** 0.922*** 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.055) (0.129) (0.072) (0.163) (0.117) 
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Table 4. Panel B 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
0.359 0.045 -0.046 -0.018 0.726 -0.071 0.379 0.231 
(0.263) (0.040) (0.060) (0.040) (0.619) (0.072) (0.310) (0.212) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
0.023*** 0.000 0.011 0.014** 0.024*** -0.008 0.036*** 0.019** 
(0.006) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008) 
Log (Firm Age) 
-0.044*** -0.034* -0.042*** -0.042** -0.047*** -0.031* -0.097*** -0.085*** 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) 
Log (Total Assets) 
0.040*** 0.028*** 0.025** 0.027** 0.046*** 0.024** 0.079*** 0.066*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.007) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
-0.005 0.010 0.028 0.023 -0.024 0.008 -0.083** -0.044* 
(0.030) (0.035) (0.051) (0.048) (0.030) (0.039) (0.033) (0.023) 
Crisis 
    1.426*** 1.464*** 1.380*** 1.433*** 
    (0.039) (0.035) (0.048) (0.043) 
Constant 
-0.168*** -0.163*** -0.169*** -0.170*** 0.185 0.023 0.461*** 0.197* 
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.117) (0.074) (0.148) (0.113) 
 
Table 5. Panel A 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
0.264** 0.024 0.264** 0.108** 0.261 0.059*** 0.181* 0.112* 
(0.103) (0.016) (0.103) (0.045) (0.176) (0.022) (0.107) (0.066) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
0.018*** 0.011*** 0.034*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log (Firm Age) 
0.032*** 0.029*** 0.001 0.008 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.008 0.012** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Log (Total Assets) 
-0.008*** -0.013*** 0.027*** 0.010** -0.009*** -0.011*** 0.008 0.002 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
-0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000* 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
0.891*** 0.902*** 0.833*** 0.866*** 0.892*** 0.901*** 0.863*** 0.879*** 
(0.036) (0.030) (0.074) (0.055) (0.033) (0.032) (0.054) (0.046) 
Crisis 
    -0.021** 0.002 -0.041*** -0.020** 
    (0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Constant 
0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.004 0.078** -0.011 0.192*** 0.088** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.035) (0.020) (0.049) (0.035) 
 
Table 5. Panel B 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
0.999 0.200 0.663 0.329 1.028 0.173 0.335 0.195 
(1.067) (0.169) (0.413) (0.216) (1.602) (0.281) (0.273) (0.146) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
0.012 -0.018 0.038* 0.004 0.007 -0.012 0.007 -0.002 
(0.018) (0.034) (0.020) (0.010) (0.016) (0.042) (0.015) (0.012) 
Log (Firm Age) 
0.014 0.015 -0.054 -0.034 0.006 0.012 -0.016 -0.000 
(0.026) (0.018) (0.067) (0.054) (0.037) (0.018) (0.067) (0.053) 
Log (Total Assets) 
0.004 -0.015* 0.070 0.032 0.003 -0.015 0.009 -0.007 
(0.027) (0.008) (0.054) (0.031) (0.034) (0.012) (0.037) (0.026) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
0.065 0.102 -0.038 0.037 0.064 0.100 0.060 0.092 
(0.065) (0.077) (0.075) (0.045) (0.081) (0.081) (0.073) (0.079) 
Crisis 
    0.084 0.145*** 0.106 0.141** 
    (0.124) (0.052) (0.094) (0.068) 
Constant 
0.226*** 0.224*** 0.159** 0.188*** 0.517 0.261** 0.434 0.267* 
(0.074) (0.073) (0.066) (0.068) (0.541) (0.130) (0.350) (0.147) 
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Table 5. Panel C 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
-0.193* -0.016 0.076* 0.067* -0.388 0.049** -0.111 -0.044 
(0.100) (0.019) (0.039) (0.036) (0.295) (0.023) (0.094) (0.049) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
0.007*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.007** 0.026*** 0.005** 0.011*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Log (Firm Age) 
0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.008 0.006 -0.003 0.022*** 0.015*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Log (Total Assets) 
0.065*** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.062*** 0.074*** 0.054*** 0.060*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
-0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000* 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
-0.918*** -0.926*** -0.947*** -0.952*** -0.911*** -0.929*** -0.900*** -0.916*** 
(0.039) (0.036) (0.021) (0.023) (0.040) (0.035) (0.051) (0.044) 
Crisis 
    0.047*** 0.028*** 0.044*** 0.025*** 
    (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
Constant 
-0.017** -0.020*** -0.017** -0.016** -0.124** -0.039* -0.138*** -0.042 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.053) (0.023) (0.043) (0.036) 
 
Table 5. Panel D 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CEO Vega/Delta 
-0.900 -0.150 -0.535 -0.248 -0.895 -0.128 -0.242 -0.102 
(1.064) (0.162) (0.404) (0.210) (1.584) (0.278) (0.265) (0.139) 
Log (Total Current Comp) 
0.014 0.042 -0.006 0.023** 0.019 0.037 0.021 0.028** 
(0.018) (0.034) (0.021) (0.010) (0.016) (0.042) (0.015) (0.012) 
Log (Firm Age) 
-0.022 -0.023 0.036 0.018 -0.014 -0.020 0.003 -0.016 
(0.026) (0.018) (0.066) (0.054) (0.037) (0.018) (0.067) (0.054) 
Log (Total Assets) 
0.024 0.042*** -0.030 0.004 0.025 0.041*** 0.023 0.040 
(0.027) (0.008) (0.055) (0.032) (0.034) (0.012) (0.037) (0.026) 
M/B Ratio 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sales Growth 
0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Return 
0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
D/E Ratio 
-0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Surplus 
-0.079 -0.114 0.003 -0.063 -0.081 -0.113 -0.084 -0.117 
(0.063) (0.074) (0.073) (0.050) (0.080) (0.078) (0.076) (0.083) 
Crisis 
    0.198 0.143*** 0.177* 0.141** 
    (0.125) (0.054) (0.095) (0.069) 
Constant 
0.164** 0.166** 0.221*** 0.195*** -0.330 -0.103 -0.242 -0.074 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.066) (0.069) (0.543) (0.139) (0.352) (0.149) 
 
Table 5. Panel E 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Profitability 
0.120** 0.121** 0.120** 0.122** 0.122** 
(0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Tangibility 
0.050 0.051 0.050 0.053 0.056 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Log (Sales) 
0.053*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Tobin’s Q 
-0.060 -0.056 -0.063 -0.055 -0.056 
(0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) 
Net Financing Deficit 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Return1 
-0.134 -0.131 -0.128 -0.131 -0.132 
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) 
Return2 
-0.161** -0.158** -0.160** -0.155** -0.154** 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Return3 
-0.238 -0.238 -0.239 -0.238 -0.241 
(0.243) (0.242) (0.242) (0.242) (0.242) 
Return4 
-0.158** -0.158** -0.154** -0.161** -0.160** 
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) 
Return5 
-0.125 -0.126 -0.122 -0.123 -0.122 
(0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) 
Stock Ownership 
-0.440*** -0.457*** -0.484*** -0.445*** -0.454*** 
(0.122) (0.121) (0.122) (0.121) (0.121) 
Vested Options 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Age 
0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CEO Tenure 
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
CEO Tenure * OC 
-0.018 -0.016 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) 
Crisis  
0.003 -0.008 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Constant 
1.255*** 1.272*** 1.257*** 1.301*** 1.313*** 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055) (0.057) 
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Table 6. Compensation and net financing deficit 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Vested Options 
-0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock Ownership 
-0.073 -0.071 -0.076 -0.071 -0.071 
(0.047) (0.048) (0.054) (0.049) (0.048) 
Book Leverage 
0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Vested*NFD 
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage*NFD 
-0.147*** -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.147*** -0.147*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Ownership*NFD 
2.055*** 2.062*** 2.064*** 2.058*** 2.058*** 
(0.442) (0.445) (0.445) (0.444) (0.444) 
Constant 
-0.089* -0.110* -0.118* -0.116* -0.114* 
(0.048) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) 
 
Table 7. Compensation and firm value 
 




 0.574*** 0.574*** 0.574*** 0.569*** 0.569*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
E-Index 
 -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 
 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Director Ownership 
 0.430 0.434 0.435 0.431 0.432 
 (0.404) (0.403) (0.403) (0.406) (0.407) 
Director Ownership2 
 -0.652 -0.651 -0.656 -0.658 -0.658 
 (0.403) (0.402) (0.402) (0.405) (0.406) 
ROA 
 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Capital Expenditures 
 0.083* 0.084* 0.082* 0.077* 0.078* 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Leverage 
 -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D 
 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D Missing 
 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm Age 
 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ATC 
 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REC 
 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEO Ownership > 20% 
 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Tenure = 1 
 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Tenure = 2 
 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Tenure = 3 or 4 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure = 5 or 6 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure Missing 
 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Diversified 
 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
CEO Outsider 
 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Chairman 
 -0.079* -0.081* -0.081* -0.083* -0.083* 




0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ind-Adj CEO Pay Slice 
0.911*** 
     
(0.012) 
     
Number of VPs 
0.008*** 
     
(0.001) 
     
CEO Only Director 
0.570*** 
     
(0.027) 
     
Constant 
0.017*** 0.648*** 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.662*** 0.661*** 
(0.002) (0.062) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
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Table 8. Panel A 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Diversified 
-0.061** -0.059** -0.059** -0.053** -0.054** 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Chairman 
-0.068** -0.070** -0.069** -0.076** -0.078** 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) 
Tenure = 1 
-0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.013 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Tenure = 2 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Tenure Missing 
-0.034*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.035*** 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
CEO Outsider 
-0.053** -0.052** -0.047** -0.052** -0.053** 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ind-Adj Tobin's Q 
-0.062 -0.063 -0.061 -0.072 -0.073 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.068) 
E-Index 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 
0.036* 0.036* 0.036* 0.040* 0.040* 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Director Ownership 
0.063 0.074 0.047 0.055 0.070 
(0.215) (0.220) (0.218) (0.219) (0.221) 
Director Ownership2 
-0.117 -0.122 -0.106 -0.129 -0.147 
(0.241) (0.244) (0.243) (0.247) (0.250) 
CAPEX/TA 
0.331 0.324 0.330 0.309 0.308 
(0.211) (0.210) (0.210) (0.211) (0.211) 
Leverage 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D 
-0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
R&D Missing 
0.016 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.015 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Age 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ATC 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REC 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO Ownership > 20% 
0.063 0.065 0.064 0.066 0.068 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Crisis  
-0.002 -0.002 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant 
0.120*** 0.148*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 
(0.031) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
Table 8. Panel B 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Diversified 
-0.059** -0.054** -0.054** -0.050* -0.050* 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Chairman 
-0.068** -0.073** -0.070** -0.079** -0.081** 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.035) 
Tenure = 1 
-0.018 -0.017 -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
Tenure = 2 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tenure = 3 or 4 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure = 5 or 6 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure = Missing 
-0.038*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.039*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
CEO Outsider 
-0.047* -0.041 -0.033 -0.041 -0.042 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) 
Ind-Adj Tobin's Q 
-0.062 -0.063 -0.062 -0.073 -0.074 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.069) (0.069) 
E-Index 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 
0.036* 0.037* 0.036* 0.040* 0.040* 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Director Ownership 
0.082 0.092 0.062 0.073 0.086 
(0.231) (0.238) (0.240) (0.234) (0.234) 
Director Ownership2 
-0.111 -0.107 -0.098 -0.117 -0.133 
(0.254) (0.258) (0.263) (0.260) (0.260) 
CAPX/TA 
0.321 0.314 0.316 0.298 0.297 
(0.209) (0.207) (0.207) (0.208) (0.209) 
Leverage 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
R&D 
-0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
R&D Missing 
0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.015 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Firm Age 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ATC 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
REC 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
CEO Ownership > 20% 
0.058 0.059 0.057 0.061 0.063 
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) 
Crisis  
-0.045*** -0.052*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) 
Constant 
0.242*** 0.289*** 0.318*** 0.282*** 0.275*** 
(0.058) (0.098) (0.118) (0.100) (0.095) 
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Table 9. Compensation and CEO turnover 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Stock Return 
21.341 15.076 10.146 18.033 17.918 
(23.986) (22.545) (22.130) (23.523) (23.083) 
Firm Return 
-18.465 -12.037 -7.113 -14.725 -14.629 
(28.615) (27.889) (27.816) (28.242) (27.933) 
Market Return 
-18.694 -11.425 -0.610 -14.249 -13.615 
(27.259) (29.002) (30.177) (27.982) (27.853) 
CEO Age > 60 
-1.646 -1.598 -1.519 -1.618 -1.619 
(1.260) (1.237) (1.215) (1.234) (1.255) 
Chairman 
4.519*** 3.948*** 4.051*** 3.983*** 4.005*** 
(0.696) (0.694) (0.676) (0.683) (0.696) 
Constant 
-4.795*** -4.617*** -4.371** -4.542*** -4.528*** 
(1.855) (1.663) (1.728) (1.752) (1.749) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
